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Guidelines for Statutes for
Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court
ELIZABETH W. BROWNE*
The juvenile court was founded in the early 1900's, premised
on the hypothesis that children who had committed misdeeds
were more malleable and could be directed to good citizenship
and responsibility more easily than adult offenders. This was to
be accomplished by separating children from hardened crim-
inals and by barring them from being placed in adult institu-
tions. It was felt that because children are susceptible to guid-
ance, the possibility of a brighter future would lie before them if
they were given humane treatment under the direction of ex-
perts in child care and child behavior.' However, most juris-
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1. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
dictions provided a method for transferring2 particular
juveniles from juvenile court to criminal court after it had been
determined that the juvenile was not an apt subject for rehabili-
tation through the resources of the juvenile court.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare3 and the
President's Crime Commission 4 in the 1960's pointed out many
defects in the juvenile justice system, including the procedure
for transferring juveniles to the criminal courts, and recom-
mended changes to better realize the original goals of the
juvenile justice system.
At the outset it should be noted that the juvenile court can no
longer transfer a juvenile to an adult court for prosecution after
the juvenile court has conducted an adjudicatory hearing.5 The
United States Supreme Court held that such a procedure vio-
lated the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Therefore, obviously, it must be a matter considered before the
adjudicatory hearing.
Transfer
Bringing children before criminal courts is accomplished in
different ways. Some states simply lower the age of juvenile
court jurisdiction so that the prosecution of children above that
age in criminal courts is automatic. Others enumerate certain
crimes over which the criminal courts always have original
jurisdiction.6 Prosecutors are given the discretion in some juris-
dictions to choose the forum in which to bring the charge.7 But
2. Although the statutes in other jurisdictions employ a variety of terms
for this process, most authorities seem to agree that "transfer" is an accurate
and descriptive word. The following sources use the word "transfer" in describ-
ing the procedure: STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT; § 13 LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR
DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT ACTS, § 31 published by the Children's
Bureau of the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1969); MODEL
RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, ART. IV prepared by the Council of Judges of the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1959); Uniform Juvenile Court
Act, § 34 approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association (1968); and LAW AND TACTICS IN
JUVENILE CASES ch. 11 (2nd Ed., 1974), published by the National Juvenile Law
Center, St. Louis University School of Law, JUVENILE LAW DIGEST published by
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
3. STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS (1966).
4. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, ch. 3 at
79-82 (1967).
5. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-536 (1975).
6. Walker v. State of Florida, 466 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1971).
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37 §702-707 (Smith-Hurd); 18 U.S.C. 5032; Meyers v.
[Vol. 4:479, 1977] Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the majority of states provide that only the juvenile court can
make the determination as to whether to retain jurisdiction of
the child or transfer jurisdiction to the criminal court.
Kent v. United States8 was the first significant case to reach
the United States Supreme Court which dealt in depth with
portions of the transfer procedure. Some state courts have
construed Kent as having been decided solely on statutory
grounds, 9 while the majority of state courts regard it as being of
constitutional dimensions. There are indications that some of
the justices on the United States Supreme Court regarded Kent
as having constitutional implications. 10 It was in Kent that the
United States Supreme Court pierced the veil of parens Patraie
for the first time.
Kent was sixteen and had been charged with housebreaking,
robbery, and rape. His mother retained counsel who opposed a
transfer of the boy when the service director of the juvenile
court indicated that the procedure was being considered. Coun-
sel moved for a hearing, a psychiatric examination of the boy
and access to the social files. He also offered to prove that Kent
was a fit subject for juvenile rehabilitation. No ruling was made
on the motions nor was any hearing held. Nevertheless, an ex
parte order was entered which stated that after "full investiga-
District Court for Fourth Judicial District, 184 Col. 181, 518 P.2d 836 (1974); State
v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W. 2d 859 (1974).
8. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
9. Although the consensus is by no means universal, a majority of com-
mentators and jurisdictions now agree that the Kent decision has constitutional
basis. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, referring to In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), decided after Kent, stated "We join a growing list of
courts that interpret Kent in the light of Gault as establishing certain minimum
constitutional rights of juveniles at such hearings." Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d
652, 654 (9th Cir. 1971). See, e.q., B. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 3
Cal. 3d 718, 478 P.2d 37, 91 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970); State ex rel T.D.H. v. Bills, 504
S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1974); Davis v. State, 297 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974); Hayes v. Gardner,
95 Idaho 137, 504 P.2d 810 (1972); In re Doe, 86 N.M. 37, 519 P.2d 133 (1974); State
v. McArdle, 194 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1973); State v. Yard, 109 Ariz. 198, 507 P.2d 123
(1973); Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972); Bouge v. Reed, 254
Or. 418,459 P.2d 869 (1969); Kempler v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.
1970). But see, People v. Handley, 51 Ill. 2d 229, 282 N.E. 2d 131 (1972); In re
Bullard, 22 N.C. App. 245, 206 S.E. 2d 305 (1974); Lijam v. District Court of
Fourth Judicial District, 161 Mt. 287, 505 P.2d 896 (1973).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). There has been some dispute about the
constitutional basis for the Kent decision, but in Gault the Court noted that
Kent "[I]ndicated agreement with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia that the assistance of counsel is essential for purposes of
waiver proceedings." 387 U.S. at 36.
tion I [the court] hereby waive"11 jurisdiction of the prisoner.
Kent was convicted in the adult court by a jury and sentenced to
thirty to ninety years in prison.
The United States Supreme Court held that Kent was entitled
to a transfer hearing, to representation by counsel who had full
access to the child's social records, to findings of fact and to a
statement of reasons for transfering him.12
11. 383 U.S. at 546.
12. In deciding that a District of Columbia order waiving jurisdiction of a
juvenile was entered without compliance with required procedures, the United
States Supreme Court first pointed out that the facts and the contentions of
counsel raised a number of disturbing questions concerning the administration
by the police and the juvenile court authorities of the District of Columbia laws
relating to juveniles. Apart from raising questions as to the adequacy of custo-
dial and treatment facilities and policies, some of which were not within judicial
competence, the case presented important challenges to the procedure of the
police and juvenile court officials upon apprehension of a juvenile suspected of
serious offenses. Id. at 542-43. From the facts, the Supreme Court assumed that
the juvenile court judge denied, sub silentio, motions for a hearing; a recom-
mendation for hospitalization for psychiatric observation; a request for access
to the Social Service file and an offer to prove that the juvenile was a fit subject
for rehabilitation under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Shortly after the
juvenile court order waiving its jurisdiction was entered, the juvenile was indict-
ed by a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that it
would not go behind the juvenile court judge's recital that his order was entered
"after full investigation."
Aside from other issues raised, in view of its ruling, the Supreme Court
confined itself to the issue regarding the alleged infirmity of the proceedings by
which the juvenile court waived its otherwise exclusive jurisdiction. While
agreeing that the Juvenile Court Act contemplates that the juvenile court should
have considerable latitude in determining whether it should retain jurisdiction
over a child or-subject to the statutory delimitation-should waive jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court pointed out that this latitude is not without limits.
Disregarding the question whether the juvenile, on the merits, should have
been transferred, the Supreme Court said that there was "[N]o place in our
system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a
statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with
adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be
extraordinary if society's special concern for children, as reflected in the Dis-
trict of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure ... (and) it
does not .... It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a
'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the
juvenile." Id. at 556.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that, as a condition to a valid
waiver order, the juvenile was entitled to a hearing, including access by his
counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably
were considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the juvenile
court's decisions. This "result" is required by the statute read in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 557.
As to the review of the waiver order, the Supreme Court held that it was
incumbent upon the juvenile court to accompany its waiver order with a state-
ment of the reasons or considerations therefor. While the statute did not require
that this statement be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional
findings of fact, it should be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory require-
482
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Age
The initial step which a transfer statute must address is the
age at which a juvenile may be eligible for transfer to a criminal
court. Obviously involved in this decision is the concept of di-
minished responsibility; the statutes of thirteen states now man-
date that sixteen is the minimum age at which a motion for
transfer may be filed.13
An additional factor to consider is whether the specified
statutory age means the age at which the act was committed or
the age at which the person is tried for the charged offense. 14
ments of "full investigation" have been met, and that the question has received
the careful consideration of the juvenile court. Furthermore, it must set forth
the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.
Also, the Court correspondingly concluded that an opportunity for a hearing,
which may be informal, must be given the juvenile prior to entry of a waiver
order. Also, the juvenile was entitled to counsel in connection with the waiver
proceeding, and counsel was entitled to see the child's social records. Appoint-
ment of counsel without affording an opportunity for hearing on a "critically
important" decision was tantamount to denial of counsel. While the hearing to
be held need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing, it must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment.
As to access by the juvenile's counsel to the social records of the child, it was
deemed obvious that, since these were to be considered by the juvenile court in
making its decision to waive jurisdiction, they must be made available to the
child's counsel. The Supreme Court further pointed out that if a decision on
waiver is "critically important" it is equally of "critical importance" that the
material submitted to the judge-which is protected by the statute only against
"indiscriminate" inspection-be subjected, within reasonable limits having re-
gard to the theory of the Juvenile Court Act, to examination, criticism and
refutation. While the juvenile court judge may, of course, receive ex parte
analyses and recommendations from his staff, he may not, for purposes of a
decision on waiver, receive and rely upon secret information, whether emanat-
ing from his staff or otherwise.
Also, the Supreme Court, even though the juvenile had reached the age of
twenty-one and the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction, refused to vacate
the conviction and dismiss the indictment. Rather, it remanded the case to the
District Court for a de novo hearing on the waiver issue.
13. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
14. A majority of states base jurisdiction on the age of the child at the time
of the alleged proscribed conduct, not the age at the time of apprehension or the
age at the time of the filing of the petition. Examples include: IOWA CODE ANN. §
232.62 (West 1941); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.1569(3) (West 1974); W. VA. CODE § 49-
5-3 (West 1974); and KAN. STAT. § 38-808(b). STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 13,
prepared by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in cooperation
with the National Council of Juvenile Judges and the U.S. Children's Bureau
(6th Ed. 1959), states that "(n)o child under sixteen years of age at the time of
commission of the act" shall be transferred to adult court.
Where the age of the child at the time of trial determines the
forum, it is possible for prosecutors to delay initiating actions in
order to avoid juvenile jurisdiction. The majority position, that
the age at the time of the act is the decisive age, is more desir-
able because it avoids delayed prosecutions and guarantees the
right to a speedy trial. The upper age limit of juvenile court
jurisdiction should be an additional factor in the decision to
retain juvenile jurisdiction; an evaluation of the efficiency of
the services available to determine whether rehabiliatory treat-
ment was likely to be completed within the time available
should be made.
Offense
Ignoring minor traffic and fish and game offenses, legisla-
tures must promulgate standards concerning the types or series
of offenses or other circumstances which may warrant a finding
that a child is not amenable to rehabilitative treatment in the
time remaining before termination of the juvenile court's juris-
diction. One who commits an egregious, heinous offense may
legitmately be considered to be beyond the juvenile court's ca-
pacity to help him. A history of repeated, violent conduct after
prior juvenile court intervention has failed may also trigger a
juvenile's transfer to criminal court.
However, a "course of conduct" transfer should not be lightly
undertaken as the conduct might have been attributable to an
averred lack of resources within the juvenile justice system.1"
15. Welfare of J.E.C., 225 N.W. 2d 245 (1975). The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota framed the question as follows:
The crucial question then in this case is whether the court may refer
appellant for adult prosecution for the reason that no program exists
or has been designed which can rehabilitate respondent, with adequate
protection for the public, prior to his twenty-first birthday. In other
words, is this reason sufficient to sustain the conclusion that appellant
is therefore not amenable to treatment as a juvenile and must be re-
ferred for prosecution as an adult? ...
We cannot help but sympathize with a judge of the juvenile court who
has tried conscientiously to find a solution to the vexing problem of
what to do with this small minority of hard-core juveniles who cannot
be corrected under our present facilities and for whom there are no
other adequate facilities.
* . . It appears that the juvenile court has under these circumstances
only two alternatives, namely, to retain jurisdiction over him as a
juvenile, with the knowledge that no matter what action is taken the
offender will soon again be turned loose on society to continue his
depredations, or to refer him as an adult for prosecution and probably
subject him to a lengthy sentence with doubtful rehabilitative sources
available. Id. at 251.
* . . The question confronting us is: What power do the courts have to
solve this problem? We can, to be sure, refuse to permit reference for
adult prosecution, but is the welfare of society served by temporarily
restraining him under a juvenile court system where the best hope will
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Perhaps treatment for the diagnosed condition of the child does
not exist. On the other hand, the absence or prior failure of
treatment may be due to a public reluctance to provide what is
needed for rehabilitation. It would seem obvious that misde-
meanors and many less serious felonies should not be transfer-
able if the juvenile court is given both the jurisdiction and the
resources to treat the child until age twenty-one.
Probable Cause Hearing
One of the first requirements of a transfer proceeding should
be a probable cause hearing.16 The lack of such a hearing was
deplored in Kent.17 The probable cause hearing should be held
within a proscribed period of time after the child has been taken
into custody so that he is not deprived of his liberty without due
process. Further, it should coincide with the detention hearing
since most children accused of serious offenses (which will raise
the issue of transfer) will be held in detention facilities as bail is
usually unavailable to juveniles. Establishing probable cause at
the detention hearing was recommended by the United States
District Court in Baldwin v. Lewis.18
be that he will soon be turned loose again to prey on society? Can the
courts mandate the Department of Corrections to establish a re-
habilitative system for this small percentage of juveniles who cannot
be rehabilitated under our present program? If we cannot mandate
such action, we can at least urge that an examination be made of it by
the authority which can establish such a system. Id. at 249-251. The
case was remanded to the juvenile court to: Inquire into (1) whether
there is presently any program available for treatment for this and
other similar juveniles; (2) if no program is available, whether it is
feasible and possible to put together an effective program which could
treat this and other similar juveniles; (3) if so, why has the Department
of Corrections failed to make such a program available? The answer to
this question may involve such things as the unavailability of funds, the
establishment of priority between programs, and the time it would take
to establish such program. Id. at 253. Browne, Elizabeth, A Right to
Treatment for Civilly Committed Persons (1975 National Council of
Juvenile Court Judges, Reno, Nevada).
16. Eighteen states require the juvenile court to make a probable cause
finding before transfer. Among them are ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15 § 2611 (3) (1964);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969); U.T.C.A. FAMILY CODE § 54.02(f) (1973); and
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.4) (West Supp. 1976). But see: United States ex.
rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 419 U.S.
1019 (1974); Stephenson v. State, 204 Kan. 80, 460. P.2d 442 (1969).
17. 383 U.S. at 551.
18. Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wisc. 1969). Also, the United
States Supreme Court said, in dictum in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 538:
We note that nothing decided today forecloses States from requiring, as
a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he
Separation of the probable cause hearing from the transfer
hearing would save the child the painful choice of deciding
whether to testify himself at the transfer hearing. If he appears
contrite and willing to accept treatment at the transfer hearing,
he may also ironically have resolved the probable cause deter-
mination against his own interest.
If the child is transfered to a criminal court, the finding of
probable cause in the juvenile court should be certified to the
criminal court and could be substituted for the preliminary
hearing required there. The child would not have sacrificed any
of his rights to discovery or to fifth and fourteenth amendment
privileges.
If probable cause is not established the child may be free from
a long period of detention. But, equally important, he will not be
subjected to the massive invasion of his privacy and that of his
family's which is an adjunct to transfer hearing investigations.
The transfer investigation should and will reach into all aspects
of his life and behavior. His school conduct, associates, contacts
with justice organizations, his physical, mental and emotional
health, religious inclinations and complete family history will
all be probed.
Counsel should be appointed in adequate time to prepare for
the detention-probable cause hearing.19 Kent, in pointing out
that the juvenile is deprived of significant juvenile rights as a
result of transfer,20 mandated the assistance of counsel at this
stage.
Present Criteria
The insidious fraility of most statutes under which juvenile
judges decide whether to retain jurisdiction over, or transfer a
committed the offense charged, so long as the showing required is not
made in an adjudicatory proceeding. (Citations omitted.) The instant
case is not one in which the judicial determination was simply a finding
of, e.g., probable cause. Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent
had violated a criminal statute.
19. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) supra note 10; Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966) supra note 12.
20. "[J]uvenile Court is vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities. He is, as
specified by the statute, shielded from publicity. He may be confined, but with
rare exceptions he may not be jailed along with adults. He may be detained, but
only until he is 21 years of age. The court is admonished by the statute to give
preference to retaining the child in the custody of his parents unless his welfare
and the safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded
without . . . removal. The child is protected against consequences of adult
conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudication against him in
subsequent proceedings, and disqualification for public employment." 383 U.S.
at 536-557.
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child to, adult court reflects the lack of legislative standards in
the juvenile court statutes. One frequently found criteria which
often stands alone in the statutes directs the juvenile judge to
base his finding on "the best interests of the child." "The best
interests of the child" appears to be a phrase borrowed from
family law practice where the issue before the court is to whom
the award of custody should be made. The normal presumption
in divorce cases is that a child will be placed in the more satis-
factory home environment available as between his parents.
When the choice is between a "benevolent" juvenile care system
and an adult penal system, however, the "best interests of the
child" criterion is not an acceptable one. An addendum is often
"and if the transfer is in the best interest of the public." If the
juvenile court is indeed fulfilling its mandate to treat the child,
the latter is superfluous. A statute with provisions similar to
those stated above has been successfully attacked as being void
for being overly vague. 2
1
Statutes should set a limited time within which the transfer
hearing must be held and permit a specific postponement by
either party only upon a showing of good cause. The court's
failure to expeditiously hear the motion would continue to im-
pose upon the child's liberty as, in most cases, the child will have
been placed in detention. Delay also prevents the initiation of
rehabilitative treatment.
Parties
The persons who could file a motion for transfer should be
limited to the district attorney, the child and the child's attor-
ney.22
21. People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972).
22. The concept that the district attorney and the child have the right to
request transfer is derived from Section 28, Assembly Bill 795, State of Wiscon-
sin (1975), and the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The
proposed Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (2) reads in part: "Jurisdiction of the juvenile
court may be waived by the court upon application of the child or of the district
attorney." Under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, a
"[j]uvenile who is alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency and
who is not surrendered to State authorities shall be proceeded against under
this chapter unless he has requested in writing upon advice of counsel to be
proceeded against as an adult .... " The Attorney General may also file a
motion to transfer in the appropriate U.S. District Court in the case of a child
who is accused of having committed a serious offense after having reached the
age of 16.
The district attorney can evaluate the known facts and decide
whether he has a case worthy of prosecution in criminal court.
As the responsible legal officer of the juvenile court, it is his
duty to be aware of the state and local resources available to the
child and he should also be able to formulate an intelligent
judgment as to whether such resources are sufficiently ade-
quate to justify the child's retention by the juvenile court sys-
tem. If a district attorney lacks personal knowledge of the re-
sources available for the juvenile's treatment, he will neverthe-
less have access to experts within the court's counseling staff
and the childrens' correctional services.
Provision should also be made to enable the child's attorney
or guardian to file the motion (with the child's consent) pursuant
to the United States Supreme Court decision of Faretta v.
California23 which provides that a defendant may represent
himself. There is little doubt that this ruling will be extended to
include children involved in transfer hearings. Allowing the
child's attorney to file for transfer has not generally been al-
lowed. Nevertheless, allowing him to do so may provide the
child some strategic advantages.24
It is proposed that juvenile judges no longer be permitted to
transfer on their own motion since transfer will no longer be a
dispositional alternative. 25 This preserves the role of the judge
as an arbitrator. It also, in the eyes of the child, maintains the
judge in the role of an impartial trier of fact rather than as
prosecutor or as one who imposes sentence before all the facts
are known.
Further, because experts are available to the state on the
issues before the court at a transfer hearing, the child, in fair-
ness, should also have access to experts of his own.
Any party should also have the right to disqualify the judge
who conducted either the detention-probable cause hearing or
23. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
24. There may be occasions when children who are 16 years of age or older
and have been accused of serious offenses may decide, in consultation with their
attorneys, that access to adult due process rights would be more beneficial to
them than the protections of the juvenile justice system. On such occasions they
should be able to file motions to transfer.
The author of LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES points out: "... [T]here
may be some benefits to a transfer decision. The juvenile frequently has a better
chance for a dismissal of the charge prior to trial, and, if the case goes to trial,
may have a better chance for acquittal since a trial by jury is not available in
most juvenile courts. If the young defendant or his friends have financial re-
sources it may be easier to obtain a release on bail prior to trial in the criminal
system since juveniles have a right to bail in only a very few states." -, Law and
Tactics in Juvenile Cases, ch. 11 at 252.
25. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, supra note 5.
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the transfer hearing from participating in the adjudication
hearing or in the criminal trial which may result.2 6
Statements made by the child at the transfer hearing should
be inadmissible in subsequent criminal or adjudication pro-
ceedings.17 This is consistent with the usual practice of preserv-
ing the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings in any other
forum other than for purposes of preparing presentencing re-
ports. If the district attorney has moved for transfer the child
should be able, at the transfer hearing, to express his contrition
and the manner in which he would aspire to cooperate with a
juvenile court plan for his rehabilitation. The parens patriae
atmosphere should not be allowed to mislead the child or to lure
him into a trap in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The child at a transfer hearing, should be able to address his
testimony to the transfer criteria which the court N ill consider
without fear of compromising his right to remain silent at a trial
on the merits of the allegations.
Criteria
The United States Supreme Court appended to its opinion in
Kent criteria formulated by the judge of the Juvenile Court of
the District of Columbia. This unusual procedure by the United
States Supreme Court has significance in itself.2 8 The Michigan
26. Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 34(e). The Commissioner's Note
to Section 34 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act states: " ... [O]n a hearing to
transfer, the judge of necessity must hear and consider matters relating ad-
versely to the child which would be inadmissible in a hearing on the merits of
the petition. Hence, the need of avoiding their prejudicial effect by requiring on
motion that another judge hear the charges made in the petition or in the
criminal court if the case is transferred."
27. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (West Supp. 1976).
28. 383 U.S. at 563-568. The authority of the judge of the Juvenile Court of
the District of Columbia to waive or transfer jurisdiction to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia is contained in the Juvenile Court Act, D.C.
CODE § 11-914. This section permits the judge to waive jurisdiction "after full
investigation" in the case of any child "sixteen years of age or older (who is)
charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult,
or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punish-
able by death or life imprisonment."
The Statute sets forth no specific standards for the exercise of this important
discretionary act, but leaves the formulation of such critieria to the judge. A
knowledge of the judge's criteria is important to the child, his parents, his
attorney, to the judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to
the United States Attorney and his assistants, and to the Metropolitan Police
Supreme Court also held that the state's statute was insufficient
because it lacked standards. The court listed suggested stand-
ards. Standards were subsequently adopted by the Michigan
Legislature.29 The Maryland Legislature has also adopted de-
Department, as well as to the staff of this court, especially the Juvenile Intake
Section.
Therefore, the judge has consulted with the Chief Judge and other judges of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with the United States
Attorney, with representatives of the Bar, and with other groups concerned and
has formulated the following criteria and principles concerning waiver of juris-
diction which are consistent with the basic aims and purpose of the Juvenile
Court Act.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the judge in deciding
whether the juvenile court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are
the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an agressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, great-
er weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be deter-
mined by consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court ±or the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmental situation, .motional attitude and pat-
tern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous con-
tacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile
courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probati -,n to this court, or prior
commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adquate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the juvenile court.
It will be the responsibility of any officer of the court's staff assigned to make
the investigation of any complaint in which waiver of jurisdiction is being
considered to develop fully all available information which may bear upon the
criteria and factors set forth above. Although not all such factors will be
involved in any individual case, the judge will consider the relevant factors in
a specific case before reaching a conclusion to waive juvenile jurisdiction and
transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for
trial under the adult procedures of that court.
29. People v. Fields, 399 Mich. 66,188 N.W. 2d 217 (1972). Andrew Fields was
almost 17 years old, was married, and his wife was expecting a baby. He had
failed on juvenile probation and was charged with breaking and entering and
uttering and publishing checks. After an extensive hearing, in which a prima
facie case was made and findings were made by the juvenile court, Fields was
transferred to adult criminal court. The circuit court affirmed the transfer
order, noting its reservation concerning the lack of standards for transfer set
forth in the statute. The statute, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.31 78 (598.4) reads as
follows:
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In any case where a child over the age of 15 years is accused of any act
the nature of which constitutes a felony, the judge of probate of the
county wherein the offense is alleged to have been committed may,
after investigation and examination, including notice to parents if ad-
dress is known, and upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, waive
jurisdiction; whereupon it shall be lawful to try such child in the court
having general criminal jurisdiction of such offense.
The court of appeals denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave
to appeal and remanded the matter to the court of appeals, which concluded:
After a careful review of the record, we are of the opinion that the
waiver proceedings in the instant case were in accord with the basic
requirements of due process and fairness, as well as our juvenile court
act. 30 Mich. App. 390, 186 N.W.2d 115 (1972).
The Supreme Court had granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of whether
the transfer statute was unconstitutional for lack of standards. The Supreme
Court noted:
The principal issue being argued in this case is the extent to which the
legislature may delegate power to another body or agency. Such dele-
gation must include sufficient standards so as to obviate any delega-
tion of legislative power. The legislature may not delegate the power
to make laws. (Emphasis added.)
The amicus brief, also citing the above chapter, argues that the juvenile
code must be considered as a whole, and states:
In addition to those set forth above, the statutory standards include the
following:
(a) The subject must be a child over the age of 15. Further, a person is
charged as an adult in the event he is charged with a criminal offense
and has reached his 17th birthday.
(b) The subject must be accused of an act the nature of which consti-
tutes a felony. (A petition is described in. . . (the statutes).)
(1) the definition of a felony is provided in the criminal law statutes
and cases.
(2) the definition of the alleged felony in question is contained in
the criminal law statutes and cases.
(c) The officer to hear the matter must be the judge of probate of the
county wherein the act is alleged to have taken place.
(d) An investigation must be made.
(e) A motion must have been made by the prosecuting attorney.
(f) Notice must be given.
(1) the manner of giving notice is set forth more fully in. . . (the
statutes).
(g) An examination (hearing) must be held.
(h) The child's right to have an attorney present is described in. . . (the
statutes). 199 N.W.2d at 220, 221.
The Supreme Court Stated:
While all of the above are in accord with general concepts of due
process none of the enumerations go to the issue of standards except
the age of the child and the nature of the offense...
It is important to understand the precise issue in this case. It is not
whether the constitutional requirements of due process stated in Kent
v. United States. . . were met. Rather, it is whether the lack of stand-
ards in the statute preclude a waiver proceeding. Id. at 221.
The child's welfare and the best interest of the state, the court held, were too
vague to be considered as standards. The Supreme Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional, stating:
If the legislature is to treat some persons under the age of 17 differently
from the entire class of persons, excluding them from the beneficent
processes and purposes of our juvenile courts, the legislature must
establish suitable and ascertainable standards whereby such persons
finitive standards.30
are to be deemed adults and treated as such subject to the processes
and penalties of our criminal law. The statute is unconstitutional be-
cause it lacks standards. Id. at 222.
The dissent by Justice Black observed that standards were set forth in the
Juvenile Court Rules adopted in 1969 and prepared by Judge James Lincoln. He
stated:
It is unnecessary to reproduce Rule 11 here beyond pointing to the
italicized headings of each division and the primary subdivisions
thereof.
The Rule is headed Hearing; Quantum of Proof; Criteria for Waiver.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of .1 are headed respectively Phase 1: Showing
of Probable Cause and Phase 2: Criteria for Waiver.
.2 is headed Notice of Waiver Hearing.
.3 is headed Right to Counsel.
.4 is headed Access to Social Reports.
.5 is headed Waiver Hearing Procedure.
.6 is headed Waiver Order; Written Statement...
By the foregoing, I do not mean to suggest that a statute, invalid for
want of standards according to the constitutional rule, may be
validated by any rule of Court which, although in itself well within the
constitutional powers of the Court, undertakes to supply what the
statute does not. It is submitted only that Section 712A.4 comes within
and is authorized by a well recognized exception to the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative powers.
Here that exception is made by an express mandate of the Constitution
declaring that the probate court and the judges thereof 'shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases of juvenile delinquents and depend-
ents, except as otherwise provided by law [,]' . . . in pursuance of
which the legislature by Section 712A.4 has not attempted to delegate to
the probate court the power to make a law or laws but, rather, has
conferred upon that court a mere legal discretion which is exercised in
discerning the course presecribed by law and which, when discerned, it
is the duty of the court to follow. Id. at 223-224.
30. In re Toporzycki, 14 Md. App. 298, 287 A.2d 66 (1972). A 17 year-old
mentally retarded boy had an extensive history of anti-social behavior. On
February 13, 1969, jurisdiction over a car stealing charge was properly trans-
ferred pursuant to the then effective transfer statute and the matter was han-
dled as a criminal case. On June 21, 1971, in reference to another matter,
jurisdiction was summarily transferred on the basis of the 1969 action.
The court held that the second transfer was invalid because the prior transfer,
conducted in accordance with a statute which had since been repealed, did not
comply with the conditions set forth in the new law.
The pertinent section of the new statute provides, inter alia that, for a sum-
mary waiver of jurisdiction to be valid, there must have been a prior court
transfer "under this section" which requires consideration of the following
factors:
(1) Age of child.
(2) Mental and physical condition of child.
(3) The child's amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program
available to delinquents.
(4) The nature of the offense.
(5) The safety of the public.
In deciding that the first waiver could not serve as the basis for the second, the
court said:
• . . We reach this conclusion not only as compelled because of the
explicit expression of legislative intent manifested by the plain words
of the statute but as proper because of the criteria which the court must
consider in making a just determination as to waiver of jurisdiction
under ... (the new statute) compared to the ambiguous requirements
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The correct criterion on which to base the decision of whether
to transfer is primarily the child's amenability to juvenile court
rehabilitation facilities. Elements which may be considered in
establishing amenability in addition to age and the nature of the
offense should be enunciated in a statute for the direction of the
court and the parties.
Among such elements should be a) the maturity (as distin-
guished from the chronological age), of the child and his sophis-
tication and judgment (this factor may be established in part by
tests administered by psychiatrists and psychologists); b) his
participation in public and private social and youth agency ac-
tivities; c) peer group relations; d) leadership ability; e) school
record; f) family history; g) church attendance; h) environment;
and i) his mental, physical and emotional health. Further, his
police record should be examined, his contacts with law en-
forcement agencies should be evaluated, and his past history (or
lack thereof) with the juvenile court should also be considered.
A child with no record of arrests or other contacts with law
enforcement agencies has a rehabilitative potential that another
child with a record may not have.
If the record reveals contacts with the juvenile court, the
child's efforts at responsible behavior should also be weighed.
Amenability to rehabilitation is closely related to both past and
present motivation and the reasons for that motivation which
the case history may reveal.31
Finding of Fact and Appeal
The order to transfer (or the refusal to order a transfer)
should be a final appealable order. The same parties who are
entitled to file the motion should also have the right to appeal.
Further, the appeal should be expedited if the child is in deten-
tion.
under. . . (the repealed statute). In other words, we feel in any event
that waiver after summary review may be made only after a waiver
under the authority of and in accordance with . . . (the new statute).
Within this frame of reference we hold that the orders of waiver of 21
June 1971 were improper and therefore an abuse of judicial discretion.
287 A.2d at 71.
31. In addition to Kent, Fields, and Toporzycki, the above criteria are
derived from the Policy Statement of the Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and
Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement, 8 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1962).
Transfer hearings are proceedings in equity and, as such, they
are reviewed de novo. As sound procedure and as An assistance
to appellate courts it is recommended that the juvenile court be
required to buttress its decisions by findings of fact.3 2 Kent
certainly seems to mandate findings. 33 Because findings indi-
cate the particular evidence the juvenile judge relied upon, re-
quiring them would simplify the review. The appealing parties'
preparation for appeal would also be aided if they knew what
evidence the court relied upon in reaching its decision.
Quantum of Evidence
Since Kent has held that the transfer proceeding is a critical
juncture in a child's life, the quantum of evidence required
ought to be clear and convincing proof that the child is not
amenable to juvenile court treatment. No statute so directs at
the present time.34 An Idaho case35 held that "a valid waiver
must be based on a specific finding, supported by substantial
and competent evidence obtained in the 'full investigation,' re-
quired by statute, that the defendant is not amenable to re-
habilitative treatment under juvenile court jurisdiction."
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that there was a pre-
sumption that favored the juvenile court retaining juris-
diction,36 and the Kansas Supreme Court has required that
there be "substantial" evidence. 37 The issue was raised in Ore-
gon but was not resolved. 38 Other states have approved the
"preponderance" standard.3 9
The quality of evidence and the records and social histories
have not been dealt with herein; they are worthy of an inde-
pendent investigation. However, the United States Supreme
Court held in Kent in 1966 that transfer was a "critical stage" of
the proceedings. 0 It subsequently held in In re Winship4l in 1970
32. Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967); see, 383 U.S. 541,
566 (1966); U.T.C.A., FAMILY CODE § 54.02(f) (1975); and A.B. 795, State of Wiscon-
sin (1975), D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (4).
33. 383 U.S. at 557.
34. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Breed v. Jones,".
the Court has never attempted to prescribe . . . the nature and quantum of
evidence that must support a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult
court." 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975).
35. State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972).
36. Atkins v. State, 290 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. 1972).
37. In re Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 499 P.2d 1131 (1972).
38. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. Mathis, 21 Or. App. 740,537 P.2d 148 (1975).
39. State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973); Claunch v.
Page, 427 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1970).
40. 383 U.S. at 546.
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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that, where a possibility exists that a child might be incar-
cerated, the quantum of evidence required must be evidence
"beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 42 This requirement was followed
by Breed v. Jones43 which held that an adjudication of guilt in a
juvenile court before transfer to an adult court constituted dou-
ble jeopardy. From these cases it is possible to deduce that the
nature of the transfer proceedings is so serious that a high
quantum of evidence must be required in order to justify a
transfer.
42. Id. at 368.
43. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535, supra, note 5.

